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October 21, 1970 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer, Esqs. 
Suite 520 - Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Stevens v. Colorado 
Fuel & Iron 
469 P*2d 3 
Dear Sirs: 
We have noted with in t e re s t the decision in the above case, 
and we wish to consider the following papers for inclusion 
in e i t he r BENDERfS FORMS OF DISCOVERY or BENDER'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE FORMS: Copy of the in ter rogator ies by or to 
e i t he r of the p a r t i e s , answers made there to , and such 
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Irwin Hall 
Managing Editor 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 10085 
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 
UNION NO. 5236, for and on behalf of its mem-
bers employed by Columbia-Geneva Division, 
United States Steel Corporation, a corporation, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECUR-
ITY OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW and 
COLUMBIA-GENEVA DIVISION OF UNITED 
STATES STEEL CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a proceeding before the Department of Em-
ployment Security of the Industrial Commission of Utah 
wherein unemployment benefits are sought on behalf of 
15 members of appellant Union. 
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DISPOSITION BY THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
The Appeals Referee denied unemployment benefits 
to each of the 15 claimants. His decision was affirmed by 
the Board of Review. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the order denying unem-
ployment benefits to the claimants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant does not attack any of the findings of fact 
duly made and entered by the Senior Appeals Referee. (See 
R. 41-45.) Consequently, the facts there found and stated 
are controlling on this appeal. (See Title 35, Chapter 4, 
Section 10(c), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.) The factual 
summary contained in appellant's brief is accurate and 
supported by evidence in the record with the following ex-
ception: At page 6 of the brief, appellant states: 
"In the instant case, employees could have ac-
cepted the cut back grade and would have continued 
in employment. However, an exact number of other 
employees with less seniority rights would have 
been laid off." (Emphasis added.) 
No record citation purporting to support such state-
ment is made as required by Rule 75 (p) (2) (2) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Furthermore, 
the record contains no admissible evidence which would 
support such a statement of fact. The only "evidence" at 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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all is the conclusion of witness Williams that if he had 
worked someone else would be "bumped" and that the state 
"would have to pay benefits to one man, one way or an-
other". 
On the contrary, Mr. Jones testified that at the time 
of the reduction in force here involved there was an un-
confirmed rumor in the mill which all of the employees 
had heard that a third shift was contemplated. This rumor 
materialized in fact on October 27, 1963, just nine days 
after the reduction in force. The expansion of the work 
force from a two to a three shift operation obviously re-
quired an expansion of the work force (R. 69-70). 
It also should be noted that this statement of alleged 
fact by appellant carries with it an inference that such 
employees hypothetically reduced would have been entitled 
to workmen's compensation. This inference appears to be 
the real peg upon which appellant seeks to hang this ap-
peal. Even assuming for purpose of argument that "an 
exact number" of other employees would have been "laid 
off", it certainly does not follow that each of them would 
have been entitled to unemployment compensation. The 
record contains no evidence which would indicate that such 
hypothetical reduction would have resulted in the payment 
of unemployment compensation to anyone. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
EACH OF THE CLAIMANTS HERE IN-
VOLVED MANIFESTLY LEFT HIS WORK 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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VOLUNTARILY WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE; 
EACH THEREFORE WAS INELIGIBLE FOR 
BENEFITS DURING THE PERIOD HERE IN-
VOLVED. 
The case at bar turns upon the provisions of Title 35, 
Chapter 4, Section 5 (a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
which provides: 
"An individual shall be ineligible for benefits 
or for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
"Voluntarily Leaving Work. 
"(a) For the week in which he has left work 
voluntarily without good cause, if so found by the 
commission, and for not less than one or more than 
the five next following weeks, as determined by the 
commission according to the circumstances in each 
case, provided that when such individual has had 
no bona fide employment between the week in which 
he voluntarily left such work without good cause 
and the week in which he filed for benefits he shall 
be disqualified for the week in which he filed for 
benefits and for not less than one or more than the 
five next following weeks." (Emphasis added.) 
Each of the claimants here involved was offered work 
in a lower pay classification. Each of them "could have 
continued in employment with the company if they had 
accepted the demotions as proposed and offered by the 
company" (R. 42). Claimant Hancock admitted that he 
elected to be laid off rather than to continue in his employ-
ment because (R. 116) : 
"Maybe I did two or three times, but between 
the SUB and unemployment I seemed to do better 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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than staying on labor out there, when you figure 
gas and everything/' 
Claimant Downey stated that he refused to accept a 
continuation of his employment but instead elected to be 
unemployed for the reason that (R. 124) : 
"Because I have got to figure that I have got 
to live the best way I can and I have always seen 
that I can make more money on the SUB and un-
employment than I can working out there labor, 
which has been—they only work four days a week." 
From evidence such as this, the Senior Appeals Ref-
eree found (R. 44) : 
"Judging from the reasons for voluntarily be-
coming unemployed as given by some of the claim-
ants, it appears that to a considerable extent they 
were motivated by the fact that they thought they 
would be better off with unemployment compensa-
tion, plus company's supplemental unemployment 
benefits, rather than continue at the reduced pay 
rate." 
The Legislature, in adopting the Unemployment Com-
pensation Act provided in Title 35, Chapter 4, Section 2 : 
"As a guide to the interpretation and applica-
tion of this act, the public policy of this state is 
declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due 
to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, 
morals, and welfare of the people of this state. Un-
employment is therefore a subject of general inter-
est and concern which requires appropriate action 
by the legislature to prevent its spread and to 
lighten its burden which now so often falls with 
crushing force upon the unemployed worker and 
his family. The achievement of social security re-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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quires protection against this greatest hazard of 
our economic life. * * *" 
Applying this legislative intent to the acts of the claim-
ants here involved, their claim for unemployment compen-
sation is without merit. Their unemployment here resulted 
from their own calculated volitional act. The legislature 
judiciously sought to alleviate the "crushing force upon the 
unemployed worker and his family" only when his unem-
ployed status resulted from factors over which he himself 
had no control. This court in Olf Nelson Construction Co. 
V. Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 525, 243 P. 2d 951 ex-
pressly so held stating: 
"As we pointed out in the Lexes case, the de-
clared policy of the Unemployment Reserve Law, as 
it was called in 1935, is to establish 
'financial reserves for the benefit of per-
sons unemployed through no fault of their 
own/ " 
In Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees V. De-
partment of Employment Security, 13 U. (2d) 262, 372 
P. 2d 987, this court re-stated the original legislative pol-
icy of coming to the assistance of the claimant only where 
his unemployment was "without fault on his part". 
Although the precise question here involved has not 
heretofore been resolved by this court, it has been treated 
by the courts in a number of other jurisdictions. The rule 
emerging from the cases is stated as follows at 90 A. L. R. 
2d at page 846: 
"A number of cases have involved the question 
whether an employee who in accordance with the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agree-
ment is transferred or offered a transfer, but re-
fuses such transfer and leaves the service of the 
employer is Voluntarily' unemployed. The general 
rule of these cases would appear to be that the em-
ployee offered a lower-paying job when there is no 
longer work available in his regular classification 
must take such a job or be considered 'voluntarily' 
unemployed. It must be noted, of course, that in 
these cases the Union's part in the transaction is to 
protect the employee from dismissal for lack of 
work, and where the employee, rather than take 
advantage of this protection, chooses to take his 
chances on doing better elsewhere, he has little 
ground for complaint." 
In Goebelbecker V. State (1958), 53 N. J. Super. 53, 
146 A. 2d 488, a claimant refused to accept a demotion 
from $2.77 per hour to $2.32 per hour. Because of the dif-
ference in the disqualification period under the New Jersey 
statute between "work refusal" and a "voluntary quit", 
the claimant there asserted that his refusal constituted a 
"work refusal", not a "voluntary quit". Whether a work 
refusal or a voluntary quit under the Utah statute is, of 
course, immaterial inasmuch as the same disqualification 
period applies to each. However, the court in the Goebel-
becker case ruled that the refusal to accept demotion con-
stituted a voluntary leaving of employment stating: 
"This argument is without merit. The relation-
ship of employer and employee was never severed 
by the employer; appellant remained on the com-
pany's payroll and retained both his seniority and 
the right to continue work at another job in his 
family group . . . The Act was not intended to of-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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fer benefits to workers as an alternate to accom-
modating their employers changed operations. Or-
dinary common sense as well as a consideration of 
the underlying purposes of unemployment compen-
sation require us to hold that claimant left work 
voluntarily rather than that he refused to accept 
suitable new employment. 
"The burden is on the claimant to establish a 
justifiable reason or excuse for his failure to ac-
cept the Croacher position. Good cause means cause 
sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leav-
ing the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks 
of the unemployed." 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Dentici V. Industrial 
Commission, 264 Wis. 181, 58 N. W. 2d 717, 720 (1953) 
entered a similar ruling in a case in which a claimant re-
fused to accept an assignment involving reduced earnings 
in another department stating: 
"* * * Here it must be held that there was 
a voluntary termination of his employment by the 
employee, because the evidence shows that by his 
acts he intended to leave his employment rather 
than accept a transfer." 
ACCORD: 
Claim of Gerdano, 2 App. Div. 2d 88, 153 N. Y. S. 2d 
924 (1956) — Where employee refused to accept demotion 
from job grade 7 to job grade 4 and was held thus to have 
voluntarily left his employment without good cause. 
Arizona, CCH Par. 8211.18 (1956) — Appeal Tribunal 
ruled that refusal to accept transfer to lower paying job 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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constituted voluntary quit without good cause. 
Indiana, CCH Par. 1975 (.487) (1951) — Review 
Board ruled that refusal to transfer to a higher paying but 
less desirable job in accordance with seniority rights con-
stituted voluntary leaving from employment. 
Indiana, CCH Par. 8214.05 (1954) — The Board of 
Review held that an employee who refused to accept trans-
fer to lower paying job voluntarily left work without good 
cause. 
Michigan, CCH Par. 8949 (1960) — The Circuit Court, 
reversing an Appeals Board award, ruled that a foreman 
could not receive unemployment compensation who had 
refused to work on a second shift stating: 
"There is no question of fact at all. It is a ques-
tion of law. If a man quits his job voluntarily, un-
less he can blame it on the employer he cannot get 
benefits.,, 
Washington, CCH Par. 8295 (1958) — The Washing-
ton Superior Court ruled that a claimant who refused to 
accept an assignment to a lower paying classification was 
disqualified from receiving benefits, stating: 
"* * * the
 Court concludes as a matter of 
law * * * the claimant left his employment 
voluntarily without good cause because * * *." 
New Jersey, CCH Par. 8322.02 (1958) — A claimant 
was held to have voluntarily quit by the Board of Review, 
and hence to be disqualified from receiving benefits, when 
he refused to exercise seniority to work in a lower paying 
job instead of accepting lay off. 
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New Jersey, CCH Par. 8338.10 (1959) — The Board 
of Review held that an employee who exercised his right 
under the labor agreement to accept lay-off, rather than 
demotion, was disqualified for voluntary leaving of work 
without good cause. 
Vermont, CCH Par. 806011 (1952) (new matters) — 
An employee who refused to accept a transfer to a lower 
paying job was disqualified because of voluntarily leaving 
work. 
Texas, CCH Par. 8188 (1955) (new matters) — The 
Employment Commission ruled that refusal to transfer to 
another job at a lower rate of pay constituted voluntary 
resignation without cause disqualifying for benefits. 
We submit that the expressed policy of the Utah Leg-
islature in adopting the unemployment compensation stat-
ute requires an adoption by this court of the rule stated 
in the authorities set forth above and that the order of 
the Industrial Commission should be affirmed. 
POINT II. 
NO AUTHORITY IS CITED IN AID OF ANY 
OF THE ARGUMENTS MADE IN APPEL-
LANT'S BRIEF; NONE OF THE ARGUMENTS 
STATED HAS MERIT. 
Each of the appellant's arguments will be discussed 
in sequence: 
a) That 15 other employees would have received 
unemployment compensation; hence, 15 em-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ployees here involved simply were "good Sa-
maritans". 
This argument appears to be the central core of ap-
pellant's argument. However, it is fraught with difficul-
ties. 
Aside from the bald and unsupported conclusion con-
tained in the "good Samaritan" testimony of witness Wil-
liams as follows, the record contains no evidence whatso-
ever which would indicate that an equal number of employ-
ees would have been placed on lay-off status. Mr. Williams 
gratuitously concluded (R. 118) : 
"Some of them had some of their SUB pay-
ments still available, but I felt I was in a little bet-
ter shape financially than some of those may have 
been, so being a good Samaritan, I accepted to take 
this cut back and let one other man stay on who 
would normally have been bumped out of the mill 
and out of all benefits had I stayed on. So the 
State would have to pay benefits to one man, one 
way or another." 
It is interesting to note that on the same page of the 
record (R. 118) Williams admitted that at the time he was 
contacted and offered a job at a lower rate of pay, "I told 
them definitely not, I was going to get out of there regard-
less." This latter admission is consistent with the testi-
mony of Mr. Jones who stated (R. 72) : 
"Yes. On Mr. Williams, on approaching him 
he refused anything we had to offer. He turned 
to me and said, 1 don't want to stay, I don't care 
what you have got to offer.' " 
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See also the testimony of witness Jones at record page 
133 as follows: 
"Boyd Williams was very indignant when we 
approached him. He knew of his tentative lay off. 
We approached him, I showed him the chart with 
his name within the job class 7 group. It was as-
terisked, at the bottom it had — those with aster-
isks are scheduled on vacation next week. Boyd 
Williams said, 'I do not want anything in the small 
diameter mill/ He signed the sign off and we left 
him." 
Contrary to the factual assumption necessary for this 
argument, the Company at the time of the lay off was con-
templating changing from a two to a three shift operation 
which would necessitate additional personnel. The third 
shift operation commenced on October 27, nine days after 
the lay off here involved (R. 69-70). 
The further conclusion of the "good Samaritan" that 
the State would have been required to pay benefits "one 
way or another", assumes, as is admitted at page 23 of 
appellant's brief, that each person hypothetically so re-
duced in force would have been otherwise eligible for un-
employment compensation benefits. There is no justifica-
tion in the record for such an assumption. Even assuming 
for purposes of argument that there would have been a 
lay off of an equal number of men, it does not follow that 
they would have received unemployment compensation ben-
efits. They may have secured other employment, they may 
have refused other proper employment or for numerous 
other reasons they may have been disqualified from receiv-
ing unemployment compensation. 
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Furthermore, this argument cannot be valid for the 
further reason that the unemployment compensation bene-
fits must be administered on an individual employee basis. 
Whether or not some other employee may or may not re-
ceive unemployment compensation is wholly immaterial in 
determining under the statute whether a particular em-
ployee meets the statutory tests. 
b) That the agreement between the Union and 
the employer permitting an employee to elect 
between accepting a demotion or taking lay 
off binds the Commission and requires the 
payment of unemployment compensation. 
This argument is patently erroneous on its face. It 
is absurd to argue that private parties by their contracts 
can change statutory requirements. The contract provision 
here involved is highly desirable from the employees' stand-
point. He frequently may prefer, as some of these employ-
ees obviously did, to attempt to obtain higher paying jobs 
rather than accept demotions to lower paying jobs. This 
was not an agreement, however, to permit these employ-
ees to draw unemployment benefits. It would not, in any 
event, change the voluntary nature of employees' acts in 
leaving available jobs, thereby disqualifying them from 
unemployment benefits under the Utah Act. 
This precise issue was before the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court in Roberts V. Industrial Commission, 2 Wis. 2d 399, 
86 N. W. 2d 406. There the claimant was entitled under 
the provisions of the labor agreement to accept lay-off 
status rather than a demotion. In ruling that the parties 
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could not by their private agreement alter the application 
of the statute governing unemployment compensation bene-
fits, the court stated: 
"To hold that by private agreement a party 
who refuses reasonable employment is entitled to 
unemployment benefits would make his eligibility 
dependent on negotiation between the employee or 
his bargaining agent rather than on the statute, 
administered by the Industrial Commission. Yet 
that is the effect which respondent now claims for 
the contract. If that is the effect of the provision 
in question the contract must be declared void in 
that respect. But we do not think the contract at-
tempted any such thing or that it need be so in-
terpreted. 
"The contract provision deals with the employ-
ee's seniority status. If he is offered a job more 
than two labor grades below his original one he 
need not take it. The parties have agreed that quit-
ting under such circumstances will not impair his 
seniority. But for compensation purposes this is 
quitting nonetheless for a cause not attributable to 
the employer as we held in Dentici v. Industrial 
Commission, supra." 
ACCORD: 
Chambers V. Owens-Ames Kimball Company, 146 Ohio 
S. 559:1 67 N. E. 2d 439. 
Bigger v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 
43 Del. 553, 53 A. 2d 761. 
Department of Labor and Industry V. Unemployment 
Compensation Board, Pa. Superior Court, 32 Law Week 
2693 (June 30,1964). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Barclay White Company v. Unemployment Compensa-
tion Board of Review, 356 Pa. 43, 50 A. 2d 336. 
c) That since the employer did not "guarantee" 
indefinite employment at a stated job class, 
the employees involved are entitled to unem-
ployment compensation. 
Again, no authority is cited for this novel argument 
and the argument is wholly invalid. It is, of course, im-
possible for any employer to make such a guarantee. To 
hold that the failure to make such guarantee justifies a 
cessation of employment and requires the payment of un-
employment compensation is so unrealistic as to be absurd. 
The Senior Appeals Referee found (R. 42) : 
'That the claimants in this case could have 
continued in employment with the Company if they 
had accepted the demotions as proposed and offered 
by the Company * * *." 
The Company made firm offers to these employees. 
It was required to do no more. If the employees had ac-
cepted the firm offers made, they would have still been 
working at the time of the hearing below in this matter 
"on a job equal to or greater than the one offered them 
at that time" (R. 75). However, instead, each of these em-
ployees voluntarily left his employment and hence volun-
tarily disqualified himself from the receipt of benefits. 
d) That the motivation of the claimants is im-
material in determining whether compensa-
tion is payable. 
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The Senior Appeals Referee found that the claimants 
here involved "to a considerable extent were motivated by 
the fact that they thought they would be better off with 
unemployment compensation, plus company supplemental 
unemployment benefits, rather than continue at the re-
duced pay rate" (R. 44). Appellant therefore asserts at 
page 22 of the brief that "what motivated the claimants 
to refuse to accept work at a lesser grade in pay is imma-
terial". This is not true. 
Under the applicable statute a claimant has the burden 
of demonstrating that his unemployment was for good 
cause. His specific reason for leaving the work force and 
becoming unemployed certainly is material to that issue. 
We submit that by admitting to a motive wholly inconsis-
tent with the stated purpose of the statute, the claimants 
disqualified themselves from any statutory benefits. In 
treating the burden of a claimant under circumstances 
similar to those here involved to establish "good cause" the 
Pennsylvania court in Fegely V. Unemployment Compen-
sation Board of Review (1960), 192 Pa. Super. 141, 159 
A. 2d 574 stated: 
"The burden of proof is upon the claimant to 
establish that he left his employment for a necessi-
tous and compelling cause * * *." 
"We have held that voluntary termination of 
employment because of refusal to accept different 
work with the same employer which is suitable and 
within his capabilities does not constitute a cause 
of compelling nature * * *." 
«* * * Tjte compensation which the claim-
ant would have received while temporarily assigned 
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to the labor department was substantial although 
lower than his previous rate of pay. Claimant had 
a right to refuse the employment but it does not 
follow that the change in the nature of the work 
and the reduction in wages in these circumstances 
placed claimant in a position whereby he could re-
fuse with good cause and thus create a status of un-
employment within the purview of the law * * *." 
The claimants' motives here demonstrate conclusively 
the absence of any "necessitous or compelling cause". Their 
motives are material to the issues here involved and com-
pel denial of benefits. 
e) That some theory of res judicata should bar 
the Industrial Commission from denying 
benefits. 
Again, no authority is cited for this novel and erron-
eous argument. As is demonstrated from the portion of 
the record quoted at pages 10-12 of appellant's brief, these 
claimants have received unemployment compensation on 
certain occasions in the past when they have elected to 
accept lay-off status rather than demotion. On such prior 
occasions, the blue slips contained no notation that the 
employees involved were voluntarily leaving their employ-
ment and benefits were routinely paid. No "official pro-
test" or "appeal" was ever taken from that action to cause 
a formal determination of the issue by the Industrial Com-
mission (R. 104). 
In the instant case, each of the employees was in-
formed prior to his being placed on lay-off status that his 
refusal to accept a cut back would be placed upon his blue 
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slip (R. 132). Consequently, the employee election not to 
work was brought to the attention of the Industrial Com-
mission. The issue then for the first time was thoroughly 
considered and decision entered. 
Since no official decision was entered in the prior sit-
uations, no doctrine of res judicata conceivably could ap-
ply. The Industrial Commission itself certainly cannot be 
bound, estopped or precluded from action by res judicata 
resulting from acts of administrative subordinants, never 
called to its attention for its approval or rejection. 
However, even assuming for purposes of argument 
that the Industrial Commission itself on some prior occa-
sion had officially ruled that these claimants were entitled 
to unemployment compensation after having voluntarily 
elected to be placed on lay-off status, such decision would 
not constitute res judicata in this case. First there is no 
showing in the record that the same factual situation pre-
vailed. Second and more importantly, the entire doctrine 
of res judicata has no application to decisions of the Com-
mission. In Cantlay and Tanzola, Inc. V. Public Service 
Commission, 120 Utah 217, 233 P. 2d 344 (1951) this court 
so ruled. There a proceeding was brought by several com-
mon carriers protesting the Commission's action in grant-
ing a competitor a permit to haul petroleum products from 
Salt Lake City to Vernal. The protestants there argued 
that since the Commission had denied a prior application 
by the applicant for a permit, the principle of res judicata 
operated to bar the granting of a subsequent application. 
This court stated at pages 222-23: 
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"The doctrine of res ad judicata applies only 
to the judicial decisions and a hearing before this 
Commission does not conclude such rights of the 
parties that it is deemed to be exercising a judicial 
function as that term is construed in reference to 
the courts." 
Similarly, in Mulcahy V. Public Service Commission, 
101 Utah 245, 117 P. 2d 298 (1941) this court held that 
a prior decision of the Public Service Commission denying 
applicant a certificate of convenience and necessity to op-
erate a common motor carrier was not res judicata as to a 
subsequent application. The court said at page 254: 
"The doctrine of res ad judicata applies only 
to judicial decisions * * * and not to legisla-
tive, executive or ministerial determinations.,, 
The issue here involved is the proper application of 
the statute. We submit that the Commission below prop-
erly interpreted the statute in this case and that its action 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that each of the claimants 
here involved voluntarily left his employment without good 
cause and that each of them disqualified himself from re-
ceiving unemployment compensation benefits during the 
period involved. A contrary ruling would fly directly into 
the face of the stated statutory policy which precipitated 
the unemployment compensation statute; it would penalize 
industrious employees who choose to work, would result 
in windfalls to rocking chair workers and would magnify 
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the unemployment problem which it was the stated purpose 
of the act to alleviate. Some of the problems inherent in 
appellant's position here are described by Justice Crockett 
in his concurring opinion in Olof Nelson Construction Co., 
et al. V. Industrial Commission, et al., 121 U. 525, 243 P. 
2d 951 as follows: 
"To permit an employee to become voluntarily 
unemployed and draw benefits would have these 
bad effects: It would tend to encourage work stop-
page and thus bring about economic waste; and it 
would put it within his power to voluntarily drain 
off the Unemployment Compensation Fund and 
thus hazard its soundness and the accomplishment 
of its purposes." 
We submit that the order of the Industrial Commission 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General. 
FRED F. DREMANN, 
General Counsel for the Dept. 
of Employment Security, 
E. V. BOORMAN, 
PARSONS, BEHLE, EVANS, 
& LATIMER. 
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